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Abstract
We use the New Zealand emissions trading scheme to explore how diffusion and learn-
ing from other emissions trading systems can explain the adoption, design, and revision
of climate policy. Drawing on secondary documents and interviews with politicians, gov-
ernment officials, business leaders, and independent commentators, we argue for further
investigation of how interactions between international and domestic factors shape the
design of climate policy, and for deeper probing of structural and shorter-term domestic
imperatives, to avoid misreading the extent and nature of international diffusion influ-
ences. We particularly stress the importance of distinguishing analytically between diffu-
sion interactions motivated by learning between jurisdictions and scrutiny aimed at
avoiding material disadvantages as a result of miscalculations in climate policy design.
Finally, we argue for greater attention to the temporal dimensions of climate policy
development in explanations of how diffusion and domestic influences may change
during policy adoption, design, and revision.
Following the introduction of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) in
2005, several other political jurisdictions established or started developing
market-based ETSs, including California, Kazakhstan, Montreal, South Korea,
China, New Zealand, and Australia.1 The spread of ETSs across diverse economic
and political contexts has led to growing interest in why and how particular
models of climate governance are taken up by different countries (Voß
2007). The literature has focused especially on how policy diffusion—the sys-
tematic influencing of government decisions by prior decisions in other coun-
tries (Simmons et al. 2006)—explains the patterns and processes through which
different methods of governing environmental problems spread (Jordan and
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Huitema 2014). Although this work has provided valuable insights on the
shared and differentiated drivers that affect the spread of particular environmen-
tal policy instruments (Boasson and Wettestad 2013; Graham et al. 2013; Jacobs
2014), most studies have focused on the decisions to adopt such policies. Con-
sequently, many policy diffusion studies have struggled to capture the dynamic
nature of policy development (see Bailey 2002; Carlson 2008, for exceptions)
and have not examined the detailed design features that determine the effective-
ness and efficiency of policies such as emissions trading.
Although recent research has directed attention to drivers and processes
affecting the design features of ETS (e.g., Wettestad and Gulbrandsen 2015),
few detailed studies exist of the mechanisms shaping their design—and thus
how diffusion and domestic influences interact during policy development
and reform. Although this has been attempted by complementary approaches
(see Marsh and Sharman 2009), the aim of this article is to contribute to this
strand of the policy diffusion literature by examining the factors that shape ETS
design and evolution, on the basis of an analysis of the New Zealand emissions
trading scheme (NZ ETS). We address three questions: why was the NZ ETS
adopted?, what factors explain its design and evolution?, and what wider lessons can
be drawn about interactions between diffusion and domestic influences during climate
policy development?
Developing the NZ ETS involved detailed examination of other ETSs, par-
ticularly the EU ETS and the failed Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction
Scheme (CPRS). However, the resultant model showed appreciable differences
from these “templates” in the sectors and gases included, approaches to
emission caps, and subsequent scheme revisions (Bailey and Inderberg 2016;
Bertram and Terry 2010; Bullock 2012; Calel 2013; Emissions Trading Scheme
Review Panel 2011). The processes underlying this outcome require deeper
investigation, to enable wider inferences about the roles of diffusion and other
factors in the design of ETSs and other climate policies.
To acquire the depth of information required to process trace factors
influencing the design of the NZ ETS, our analysis utilizes official reports, party
and cabinet papers, and public reports alongside twenty-two expert interviews.
The interviews were conducted in mid-2015 with five New Zealand politicians
from varying roles and parties, four government officials from different depart-
ments, seven independent analysts, and six business leaders involved in design-
ing, advising, or commenting on the scheme. The interviewees were selected by
using prior mapping from documentary sources alongside a snowball approach
during the interview period. Efforts were made to balance the organizations rep-
resented and to incorporate critical voices, supporters of the scheme, and poli-
ticians from different parties. However, some difficulties were encountered. It
proved difficult to recruit experts from the NGO sector, because relatively few
NGO representatives had technical expertise about the scheme or detailed
knowledge of the political processes involved in designing it. This was compen-
sated for through interviews with independent analysts who have commented
32 • Designing New Zealand’s Emissions Trading Scheme
on the scheme’s design. The interviews included questions about the adoption,
design, and changes to the NZ ETS; the main actors involved; the political pro-
cesses associated with the scheme’s development; and sources of information
and idea gathering. The interviews were also tailored to the particular areas of
expertise of each interviewee. We transcribed the interviews, and sent them to
the interviewees for approval. Although our interviews were the primary source
of information for understanding the formal and informal processes involved in
designing the NZ ETS, this information was triangulated with official docu-
ments and research papers to produce reliable and representative insights
into the process of developing the NZ ETS.
ETS Design Understood Through an Interacting-Drivers Approach
In analyzing the factors conditioning the creation and revision of the NZ ETS,
our general expectation was of multifaceted and dynamic interactions between
international and national influences (Jordan et al. 2003). Although it is helpful
for analytical purposes to distinguish between domestic and international influ-
ences and to examine the “interactions” between them, clearly such influences
are not easily separable (Marsh and Sharman 2009). As Rose (1991, 21) notes:
“We would never expect a program to transfer from one government to another
without history, culture and institutions being taken into account.” Our account
of the conditions affecting the adoption and design of the NZ ETS therefore
emphasizes how international diffusion and domestic factors act conjointly to
coproduce policy outcomes. Since the division between mechanisms is some-
what artificial (Marsh and Sharman 2009), our analysis consciously involves
elements of stylization. The analytical distinctions nevertheless provide a basis
for elucidating the most important factors and processes that have shaped the
NZ ETS. We begin by outlining the main features of these perspectives.
The Diffusion Perspective
Diffusion refers to processes through which changes in one state’s policy choices
are identifiably influenced by prior policy choices in another jurisdiction, as a
result of direct or indirect interactions (Simmons et al. 2006). Although this im-
plies that diffusion usually prompts policy convergence, it can equally provoke
divergence if knowledge acquisition spurs the rejection of approaches used else-
where (Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer 2014). However, including both possibili-
ties would create conceptual messiness if depicting all interactions as diffusion
were to inadvertently overmagnify international diffusion as an explanation for
ETS design.
Diffusion generally occurs in response to two main triggers: material con-
sequences and/or learning (Underdal 2013; Underdal et al. 2015). The material
consequences typically relate to traceable impacts from policy decisions made
elsewhere (Keohane and Nye 1977), based on some form of bounded rational
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reasoning (Simons 1991). These may be coercive: for instance, dependencies
created by trade links or international treaties that promote certain policies
and design features, whereby “to access certain resources, national governments
must comply with given policy requirements” (Gilardi 2013, 463). Indications
of coercive forces include implicit or explicit threats unless certain policies are
adopted—or, more likely, legally binding decisions made via supranational
processes, such as international climate or trade agreements. Material conse-
quences may also be competitive—related, for example, to design features aimed
at countering economic disadvantages created by another country’s policies
rather than by domestic factors. The typical example is tax competition and a
race to the bottom to attract economic benefits, but there are also examples
of competition for leadership, in which gaining access to important export
markets pushes countries to strengthen environmental regulation (Gilardi
2013; Underdal 2013). Such asymmetric dependency might be indicated by
explicit references to competitive concerns arising from decisions made by key
trading partners.
Learning in the present context relates to the travel and impact of policy
ideas (Rose 1991; Røvik 2011) from abroad or within countries by means of
relevant actors and networks in response to cognitive and/or normative triggers.
Learning can be further divided into two main mechanisms. Sophisticated learn-
ing is typified, inter alia, by discussion papers and debates leading to identifiable
decisions and design features adopting, in modified form, policy approaches
used by other countries. Here, new information is considered and applied in
a bounded rational way from policy examples in other countries or interna-
tional networks (Underdal 2013). Simple emulation is indicated by relatively
uncritical assessments of external models and direct copying of ETS features.
Emulation represents a more normative adoption mechanism—where such
adoption does not follow identifiably rational reasoning, but instead is based
on preconceptions of legitimacy or the professed appropriateness of model for a
given situation (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Meyer and Rowan 1977).
The Domestic Perspective
Domestic factors influencing policy adoption have been theorized in different
ways, and there have been calls to incorporate these factors when analyzing dif-
fusion (Marsh and Sharman 2009). For analytical purposes, we divide the con-
ditioning of diffusion influences by national factors into structural/slow-changing
national conditions and dynamic and more short-term factors (Bailey et al. 2012;
Inderberg and Wettestad 2015). Additionally, events may form a subset of do-
mestic influences, because of their unpredictability and relative independence
from—but sometimes profound impact on—decision-making.
We further define structural conditions, or the prevailing characteristics of
countries, as far-reaching and slow-changing influences that span economic,
political, and sociocultural conditions to affect policy development and
34 • Designing New Zealand’s Emissions Trading Scheme
international diffusion. Such structural factors typically include the economy’s
external dependencies, economic profile, emissions portfolio, types and
strengths of political traditions, and national self-image, all of which “position”
countries and contribute to constructions of their national interests (Bührs
2008; Moravscik 1997). In line with “goodness of fit” theory (Bailey 2002;
Börzel and Risse 2003), the adoption and design of environmental policy
models may be at least partly conditioned by their congruence with national
interests and policy approaches. For example, New Zealand’s reliance on
trade-exposed primary sectors sits uneasily with the uncritical adoption of high
carbon prices not adopted by competitor countries. We might therefore expect
greater compatibility between an ETS design feature and key national character-
istics or preferences to increase the chances of adoption in some form. Con-
versely, larger nonconformities would encourage non-adoption or greater
adaptation of the design elements. Particular emissions trading features may
also be adopted for symbolic purposes. For example, rhetoric may emphasize
emissions trading for image-building purposes, even if most emission reduc-
tions are achieved using nontrading instruments (Victor 2009). Similarly,
price-management or assistance measures may be adopted to promote stake-
holder acceptance rather than to offset proven economic or distributional
impacts (Meyer and Rowan 1977).
Dynamic factors typically occur when interest groups seek to maximize
their interests and/or political leverage (Moravscik 1997). Stable equilibria of
interests, preferences, and coalitions are rare within domestic politics, not least
because political parties support different interest constituencies and influence
political debates to varying degrees (Eikeland and Inderberg 2016). Political
changes and lobbying may alter coalitions and preferences, prompting varia-
tions in diffusion outcomes for specific design elements and policy choices.
Investigating domestic influences on diffusion outcomes necessitates examining
party stances on the NZ ETS (and the political interests influencing these
stances) as well as shifts in the influences of political parties. Again, the general
expectation is that incumbents may seek to modify an ETS design to accommo-
date the major interests of their constituencies.
The next issue concerns the effects of events on increasing or reducing the
leverage of different arguments and groups. These effects are difficult to theorize
predictively, though events are widely recognized as influencing institutional
and political processes (Arthur 1989; Collier and Collier 1991; Inderberg
2012). Such events may relate directly or indirectly to climate and energy issues
and may occur at the international or country level—but in both cases, they pro-
vide policy entrepreneurs and interest groups with windows of opportunity to
steer public agendas and influence policy choices and diffusion processes
toward their interests (Boasson 2014). For example, the global financial crisis
produced far-reaching impacts and created recessionary pressures that reduced
emissions and contributed to low EU carbon prices, but it also served to lessen
political and public appetites for climate action in many countries.
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The NZ ETS and the Adoption Process
The NZ ETS was established as New Zealand’s cornerstone climate mitigation
policy under the Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment
Act in September 2008. The ETS set single-year allowance trading and compli-
ance periods using (mostly) freely allocated emission units and surrender obli-
gations based on historic absolute emissions. Initially, participants were
required to surrender one NZ unit (NZU) for each ton of CO2 equivalent emit-
ted. However, although the number of NZUs issued was limited, unrestricted
access to international units was also permitted, leading to an ETS without a
fixed national cap because the scheme did not establish an emission reduction
trajectory or binding domestic emission limits beyond New Zealand’s Kyoto
commitment to return emissions to 1990 levels by 2008–2012 (New Zealand
Government 2007a). The approach was instead designed to promote abatement
via pricing and trading rather than genuine cap and trade (Bertram and Terry
2010).
The 2008 legislation envisaged a phasing in of sectors: forestry (2008);
liquid fossil fuels, mainly transport (2009); stationary-energy and industrial pro-
cesses (2010); agriculture (originally 2013, now deferred); and waste (2013)
(New Zealand Government 2007a). Phasing in was based principally on the
perceived feasibility of involvement in the ETS rather than on clear prioritization
based on contributions to reducing emissions. The main contributors to
New Zealand’s emissions profile at the time were agriculture (49%), energy
(43%), and transport (19%) (New Zealand Government 2007a).
In November 2008, following the passage of the ETS Act the previous
month, the Labour government lost the general election and was replaced by
a minority government led by the National Party, working with the ACT Party,
Maori Party, and United Future. The NZ ETS quickly became a target for revision
by the National Party. The first two revisions of the NZ ETS took place in 2009
and 2012, and a further review was ongoing in 2016. The first revision included
several transitional arrangements that reflected the new government’s agenda
and attempts to align the NZ ETS with the CPRS being developed in Australia
(Bullock 2012). These included delays to the inclusion of some sectors, notably
agriculture, until 2015; the creation of a “one-for-two” measure, permitting cer-
tain sectors to surrender one NZU for every two tons of emissions; and a $25 per
ton cap on allowances (Bullock 2012, 662–663). The 2009 reform also altered
the basis of allowance allocations, from absolute allocations based on 1990
emissions to intensity-based allocations on output measured against estimated
industry averages. The 2012 revision was notable for the government’s refusal to
enact changes recommended by the Emissions Trading Scheme Review Panel
(2011)—an independent body established to provide advice on the scheme—
that transition measures should be phased out and agriculture phased in,
although another recommendation to remove prescheduled reviews of the
ETS was adopted. In the last review, the government decided to phase out
the “one-for-two” measure between 2017 and 2019.
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Conditions Shaping the Adoption and Design of the NZ ETS
The Drivers Influencing the Adoption of the NZ ETS
Several international diffusion mechanisms were found to have influenced the
adoption of the NZ ETS. The first was the ideational and material impacts of the
Kyoto Protocol. This was the only coercive material-consequences mechanism
found, because failing to provide a policy response to Kyoto would have been
viewed unfavorably by the international community,2 and several interviewees
argued that Kyoto was a significant driver for the ETS (and for later strategic de-
cisions). Internal policy notes and official references further indicate that aware-
ness of an international trend toward creating ETSs added to the momentum for
this policy solution, whereas other documents refer to reputational factors, in
particular to the NZ ETS as the “[f]irst domestic scheme in the world to include
obligations for agriculture” (New Zealand Government 2007b, 7).
International impacts, however, extended beyond Kyoto to the political
and ideational influences of other ETSs. As one interviewee put it: “The EU
ETS was very important because it proved… that emissions trading could work”
(independent technical expert). Additionally, when asked about the effective-
ness and suitability of the EU ETS for New Zealand’s export-oriented and
land-use-based economy, officials provided mixed assessments. Nevertheless,
they felt that participation in international networks had helped persuade the
Clark government of the merits of an ETS.
In addition to these fairly standard international diffusion mechanisms,
the political challenges created by New Zealand’s atypical emissions portfolio
were identified as pivotal in the adoption and design of the NZ ETS. Unlike
most other OECD countries, New Zealand’s stationary-energy emissions are rel-
atively low because around 80 percent of electricity generation comes from re-
newable sources (New Zealand Government 2015, 42), whereas New Zealand’s
agricultural sector still produces nearly 49 percent of national emissions. Addi-
tionally, New Zealand accounts for just 0.15–0.2 percent of global emissions,
although it ranks 12th globally in per-capita emissions as a result of its
emissions-intensive primary export industries and reliance on private transport
(New Zealand Government 2007a, 2). Political challenges for the ETS thus
included the limited scope for further decarbonization of the electricity sector
(often a main target of ETSs), technological and economic obstacles to reducing
agricultural emissions, and the limited climate impact of reducing New Zealand’s
emissions, as compared with the potential economic impacts of stringent climate
policies (Jiang et al. 2009). Although New Zealand has the potential for reducing
transport emissions, its lack of motor-vehicle manufacturing and small, dis-
persed population create challenges for large-scale emission reductions (Bailey
and Inderberg 2016; Bertram and Terry 2010).
2. However, one business-sector interviewee referred to the government’s “cavalier” adoption of
the Kyoto target and saw it as opening up a Pandora’s box for New Zealand businesses.
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The adoption of the NZ ETS was also significantly conditioned by devel-
opments in New Zealand politics. The Labour Party had held power for three
consecutive terms under Helen Clark by the time the ETS was negotiated in
2008, and the widespread expectation was that Labour would lose the 2008
election. Additionally, the government had originally proposed a carbon tax
in 2005 as its response to Kyoto, but this was abandoned following fierce resis-
tance from the National Party and major interest groups, who dubbed it “the
fart tax” for including methane emissions from ruminant animals. These two
factors significantly narrowed the government’s policy options (New Zealand
Government 2007b) and contributed to the ETS emerging as the main candi-
date policy for discharging New Zealand’s Kyoto obligation. This pressure was
intensified by the government’s previous reliance on “voluntary and informa-
tional instruments,” an approach that had resulted in emissions increasing
24.7 percent above 1990 levels by 2005 (Bührs 2008, 65).
Another national characteristic mentioned by interviewees was that a
market-based instrument corresponded well with a neoliberally minded ap-
proach to economic management in key government departments, particularly
the Treasury. Interviewees referred to the “Rogernomics”3 economic reforms that
began in 1984, triggering far-reaching market-led restructuring and deregulation
that has since solidified into a general preference for market-based approaches.
Another important domestic characteristic was awareness of the need for
any future climate policy instrument to manage forestry issues. Although forestry
is an international consideration under the Kyoto Protocol, it forms more of a
domestic characteristic within New Zealand, because of the large contribution of
land-use activities to the country’s emissions. Discussions particularly focused on
potential emission liabilities arising from deforestation and the climate and
financial benefits from creating forestry-related credits within the ETS, with the
latter becoming a key driver for the adoption of a market-based mechanism
(New Zealand Government 2007a).
Other important drivers can be traced to interplays between material con-
sequences and national characteristics. One recurring argument among inter-
viewees was that the Kyoto target was portrayed as a significant future
financial liability for New Zealand, which could compromise the competitive-
ness of its specialized and trade-exposed economy. Kyoto was further presented
as a burden on taxpayers if the government was forced to buy large quantities of
international units. An ETS could correspondingly be presented as a way of
devolving and reducing financial risk while incentivizing abatement by pricing
carbon in an open market—a view reinforced by the early inclusion of manda-
tory obligations for pre-1990 forests to reduce deforestation liabilities. This lia-
bility could theoretically have been managed using a carbon tax; however, the
prospect of gaining financially from selling afforestation credits from post-1989
3. A portmanteau term drawing parallels between the economic reforms initiated in the 1980s
under Minister of Finance Roger Douglas and US “Reaganomics.”
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forests on international markets added to arguments for an ETS. Allied to this
was New Zealand’s efficiency in key sectors, especially agriculture, and the pros-
pect of protecting and exporting these efficiencies through New Zealand’s
involvement in an ETS involving international trading. The latter argument
thus blends elements of protectionism with country-specific comparative
advantages—although forest credits have more recently become a potential
liability, because low NZU prices have not incentivized new planting or deterred
harvesting and the conversion of forest to dairying (Luth Richter and Chambers
2014).
Factors Influencing Design Features of the NZ ETS
As with the original decision to adopt the ETS, interviewees indicated that the
scheme’s design was informed by a combination of international ideational in-
fluences, material consequences, and domestic political pressures. To explain
these interactions and the political ethos affecting the design features, it is useful
to identify the main actors involved in the design process. Arguably the most
influential was the Treasury, through its role in the Emissions Trading Group
(ETG)—the cross-government team tasked with developing proposals for the
scheme’s design—and other ministerial forums. The ETG was led by the Minis-
try for the Environment and included technical experts from Environment, Trea-
sury, Economic Development, Transport, and Agriculture and Forestry, but it
was housed at the Treasury. Other expert groups who advised on the strategic
or operational ETS design included the Climate Change Leadership Forum, a
body with high-level representation from relevant ministries and the private
sector (agriculture, energy, forestry, and industry), and sector-specific groups
such as the Electricity Allocation Factor Contact Group and the Business Oppor-
tunities Working Group. The composition of these groups guaranteed represen-
tation and links to government officials for industry, as well as ensuring a
prominent role for the Treasury in defining the ETS’s goals and financial param-
eters. As might be expected, the Ministry for the Environment favored more
stringent design features, whereas the Treasury and the Ministry of Business,
Innovation and Employment advocated a more business-friendly design. The
Ministry for Primary Industries maneuvered between these camps, seeking to
maximize the benefits of forest credits while protecting its sectors. The govern-
ment, spurred by technical and lobby groups, was nevertheless instrumental in
filtering international diffusion influences through perceptions of national
interests during the detailed design of the NZ ETS.
One striking example of this was the decision to avoid a scheme-specific
cap (unlike most national ETSs) and to create only a weak link between the
number of units available and national emission targets (Bertram and Terry
2010). This choice primarily reflected the adaptation of diffusion influences
to improve their fit with identified national characteristics and the protection
of strategic primary industries. Interviewees from both the public and corporate
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sectors argued that the absence of defined caps drew heavily on the logic of
Kyoto trading, rather than on other cap-and-trade schemes. Several interviewees
further noted that the cap design was based on predetermined “economic first
principles.” In practice this meant that decisions on strategic design issues to
align the ETS with New Zealand’s open trading economy were made prior to
designing features that suited these principles. Prior to 2008, a design working
group undertook a detailed review of the EU ETS but decided that problems
with the EU scheme and major differences from the New Zealand context meant
that the EU scheme mainly “provided examples for how not to do it.”
Similar reasoning informed the emission reduction ambition of the NZ
ETS, which is generally regarded as low, despite aligning with New Zealand’s
Kyoto target. However, this has been accompanied by the almost-total removal
or nonimplementation of such complementary measures as renewable energy
targets, direct expenditure, or other policies. Several interviewees remarked that
this reflected the general neoliberal ethos in the New Zealand political economy
and, especially, Treasury’s influence over the ETS design. Interviewees who
expressed support for the ETS also noted a widespread belief among key advi-
sors that pricing carbon through a well-designed ETS would flow dynamically
through all sectors of the economy to incentivize abatement, and that there was
no case for creating regulatory “double jeopardies” by introducing complemen-
tary measures.
Many allowances are allocated free of charge to participants, on the basis
of varying rationales. Fisheries (although not mandatory participants) receive
allowances based on historical emissions; owners of pre-1990 forests received
fixed free allocations; energy-intensive, trade-exposed industrial sectors receive
90 percent free allowances based on output-intensity modeling; and moderately
exposed sectors receive 60 percent free allocations (iCap 2016). This change oc-
curred after the 2009 revisions, when the scheme moved from allocations based
on absolute historic emissions to production-based allocations. The latter allo-
cations were based on design work for the Australian CPRS and were criticized
by interviewees as inappropriate for New Zealand because even comparable in-
dustries have divergent fuel sources and emissions profiles. This was the closest
example of simple emulation from another country, but it still caused contro-
versy when dairying failed to qualify for free allowances based on these metrics.
This was cited as a key factor behind the delay in including biological agricul-
tural emissions in the scheme.
In theory, the NZ ETS has broader sector and gases coverage than other
national ETSs, although its “all-gases, all-sectors” approach has been eroded
by transitional periods introduced in the 2009 revisions (Diaz-Rainey and
Tulloch 2016). The decision to include all gases and sectors was prompted by
the high representation of agriculture and forestry in New Zealand’s emissions
profile (New Zealand Government 2007b). Interviewees indicated that this was
seen as essential for target achievement because stationary electricity is predom-
inantly derived from renewable sources (New Zealand Government 2015, 42).
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Successive delays in the inclusion of agriculture again reflect domestic sector
lobbying about competitive material consequences, due to a dearth of afford-
able options for reducing biological emissions and the dangers of increasing
production costs for lower-value export sectors, such as dairy and meat.
In terms of reporting emission reductions, the government’s preference
has been for points of obligation as far “upstream” as possible within sectors
to reduce the number of entities monitored and administrative complexity/
costs. Again, this reflects domestic preferences—in this case, the first-principle
and neoliberal economic discourses in New Zealand portraying the Kyoto target
as a financial burden and the main purpose of the ETS as a low-cost policy for
discharging the burden. Officials examined the EU’s target installations ap-
proach and opted instead for upstream obligations to reflect institutional pref-
erences for administrative efficiency and because sectors such as aluminum and
steel consist of just one or two players. The main conflict on obligations has
been agriculture, in which the government preferred upstream obligations but
the sector has pressed for on-farm obligations to create incentives through
which emission reductions could best be achieved and rewards recognized.
This again has impeded the full inclusion of agriculture within the ETS.
Several interviewees noted that, until June 2016, the NZ ETS was almost
entirely open to using international credits to offset domestic emissions
(although some restrictions were implemented in 2011 and 2012 to reduce
problems with both “hot air” and fraudulent units and to maintain system in-
tegrity). The NZ ETS is not officially linked to other schemes, but discussions
were held with the EU and Australia to investigate linking possibilities. Addi-
tionally, prior to its decision not to ratify Kyoto II, New Zealand had relied
heavily on external offsets to discharge its international commitments, justified
by the perceived lack of technically feasible and/or affordable abatement op-
tions in agriculture. Coupled with this was the opportunity for New Zealand
to benefit financially from selling forestry credits overseas. Again, both represent
domestic pressures and material consequences linked to maintaining competi-
tiveness. Closing the ETS to the surrender of international units in the NZ ETS
by June 2015 was attributed to leaving Kyoto II, which closed New Zealand’s
access to Kyoto trading mechanisms (Diaz-Rainey and Tulloch 2016; Macey
2014). Some restrictions were placed on the sale of units overseas during the
transition period (legislated to end on December 31, 2012) to add robustness
to the scheme. However, this connection was fairly notional, since it excluded
forest-removal credits, an issue that led to differences of opinion between
New Zealand and the EU during their linking discussions.
Monitoring in the NZ ETS differs from that in many other schemes, in that
it principally involves self-reporting by target entities; selective third-party audit-
ing is required only to ensure integrity or when participants apply to use non-
standard emission factors. The main justification for this mentioned by
interviewees was that self-reporting works well in the New Zealand tax system
and had proved robust during preparatory work for the carbon tax. As with
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point-of-obligation requirements, officials scrutinized approaches used else-
where but preferred self-reporting; interviewees maintained that the system
operated efficiently, and there is little evidence of international diffusion on
monitoring, reporting, and verification.
A price ceiling of NZ$ 25 per ton was introduced under the 2009 ETS re-
forms, but no price floor has been established. No other government had set a
price ceiling at the time (Australia’s fixed price was not adopted until 2011), so
this is again attributable mainly to domestic lobbying to protect trade-exposed
industries against upward price risk. A further unique price management mea-
sure was the decision in 2009 only to require stationary-energy, fossil-fuel, and
industrial entities to surrender one NZU for two tons of CO2 equivalent emit-
ted. A temporary measure extended on the grounds that competitors (particu-
larly the US and Australia) had not introduced emissions trading, it was a
priority issue under the 2015–2016 review and will be phased out by 2019
(Ministry for the Environment 2015; Ministry for the Environment 2016).
Additionally, although the government has maintained faith in the allocative
efficiencies of a market-based instrument, the NZ ETS contains only peripheral
commitments to earmarking revenues and remains the dominant policy for
curbing emissions.
Although interviewees maintained that the main features and parameters
of the ETS design were informed primarily by sophisticated learning in response to
domestic pressures and the material consequences of New Zealand’s Kyoto target, evi-
dence exists of active scrutiny and the adapted incorporation of technical fea-
tures from other ETSs. Major examples include the emission conversion
factors used for different sectors, which were largely borrowed from the
Australian CPRS, and the design of rules for forestry to ensure their compatibility
with Kyoto accounting standards.
Most design characteristics were finalized by the ministries-led ETG, but as
noted, technical discussions involved a range of cross-sectoral groups, including
the Technical Advisory Group, the Electricity Allocation Factor Contact Group,
and the Ministries of Agriculture, Forestry Measurement, Stationary Energy and
Industrial Processes, Transport Fuels, and Waste, representing industry sectors,
ministries, local government, and independent analysts. This gave affected
industries multiple opportunities to raise issues and influence technical design
issues. These groups were also aided by more dynamic domestic factors, not
least the election of the National Party government in 2008. Although National
opposed the original ETS bill, they supported an ETS in principle and worked
in government via the 2009 and 2012 revisions to tailor its provisions while
preserving the scheme’s architecture.
Analyzing International and Domestic Influences in Combination
With the main factors influencing the adoption and design of the NZ ETS now
identified, this section will summarize the main findings and then use them to
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explore an integrated “interacting-drivers” perspective, in an attempt to capture
more fully how diffusion and domestic factors interacted to shape the design of
an ETS as a particular form of climate policy.
International Diffusion
The preceding analysis shows that international diffusion played a fairly modest
role in the design of the NZ ETS and that diffusion influences were closely scru-
tinized for their compatibility with the government’s “first economic principles”
for ETS adoption and design. Interviewees argued that designing the market
was, in fact, reasonably straightforward once these principles had been estab-
lished and suitable cross-ministerial expertise enlisted. The process was also
facilitated by technical competence gained from the failed carbon-tax proposal,
which aided the analysis of design elements from other schemes against
New Zealand’s circumstances and perceived national interests. Because internal
expertise was appreciably controlled by the Treasury, both the first principles and
the ETS design were steered toward reducing the cost of meeting New Zealand’s
Kyoto target.
For these reasons, international material consequences emerged as the main
diffusion influence on the initial design and revisions of the NZ ETS, although
learning as a result of participation in the Kyoto negotiations and other interna-
tional networks was more evident in the decision to adopt an ETS at all. In par-
ticular, the absence of an overall emission cap, the ceiling price, measures
allowing some sectors to surrender one NZU for every two tons of emissions,
and the exclusion of agricultural biological emissions all indicate divergence
from other national schemes, underpinned by a defensive approach to mitigat-
ing international material consequences.
National Interest and Domestic Politics
The prominence of international material consequences indicates that national
interests and domestic politics exerted powerful conditioning effects on the NZ
ETS. Decisions on the adoption and timing of a market-based instrument also
showed domestic political influences, not least Labour’s commitment to intro-
duce the NZ ETS before the 2008 election following the failed carbon tax, as
well as subsequent moves by the National Party government to revise the
scheme in response to key agricultural and business constituencies.
However, domestic influences appear to have extended beyond pure
interest-group lobbying (Benwell 2008) to the wider processes used to deter-
mine New Zealand’s national interests in climate mitigation. In particular, inter-
viewees cited general equilibrium models of the impacts of different emission
and carbon-price scenarios produced by New Zealand–based organizations such
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as Motu, NZIER,4 and Infometrics. Here, interviewees indicated sophisticated
learning by officials and politicians, whereby modeling was matched with
higher-level first principles, rather than design features being shaped primarily
by adapting design features from other schemes. Much of the NZ ETS can thus
be understood in terms of “goodness of fit” between key officials’ and politi-
cians’ interpretations of the national interests and design features in other ETSs.
Generally speaking, diverging goodness of fit between domestic priorities and their
ETS design models prompted active sophisticated learning, leading to diverging
ETS outcomes.
International comparisons (particularly with the EU ETS and the Australian
scheme) were important to the discussions on ETS design. However, the
principal objectives here appear to have been to defend New Zealand’s compet-
itive advantages; to limit taxpayer burdens (an electoral acceptability goal); and
to meet international obligations, rather than learning about policy design in
its purer sense. This is illustrated by the emphasis on international credits,
although differences between the EU’s and New Zealand’s circumstances made
formal linking difficult, and attention instead focused on New Zealand’s largest
trading partner, Australia, with whom greater commonalities appeared to exist.
The Role of Events
Alongside international and domestic political influences, other events that
have contributed to revisions of the NZ ETS warrant mentioning. The global
financial crisis began soon after the ETS was legislated; it hit New Zealand hard,
giving interest groups increased leverage to lobby for design changes. The weak
outcome of the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009, meanwhile, sent
signals that New Zealand should maintain a cautious approach to carbon
pricing—a view compounded in 2010 by the collapse of the Australian CPRS
and the closure of an important prospective link, which additionally fed com-
petitiveness concerns because of the two countries’ trade links. Because many
companies operate across the two countries, politicians and officials feared that
some might relocate their activities to Australia to avoid carbon pricing. Third,
the 2010 and 2011 Christchurch earthquakes placed added pressures on the
economy related to both funding reconstruction and insurance premiums,
further weakening arguments for repealing the 2009 transitional measures.
Finally, the open nature of the NZ ETS exposed NZU prices to the collapse
of international emission prices in 2011 (Diaz-Rainey and Tulloch 2016). Inter-
viewees saw this as “unfortunate,” and no links were traced to modifications to
the scheme. This event could have been used to tighten the scheme to bolster
NZU prices; that this did not happen perhaps provides a further indication of
the influence of key interest groups and the path dependency in government
4. New Zealand Institute of Economic Research: http://nzier.org.nz/.
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thinking toward climate policy vis-à-vis economic competitiveness. The effects
of events are often difficult to predict. However, in the case of the NZ ETS, events
appear generally to have further concentrated attention toward competitive and
domestic issues and to have created leverage for reductions in the scheme’s
ambition rather than for measures to be tightened.
Interacting-Drivers Perspective on the Design of the NZ ETS
So far, we have examined diffusion and domestic influences on the NZ ETS in
relative isolation. In reality, however, those designing the scheme were required
to evaluate multiple factors simultaneously during changing political circum-
stances. Accordingly, this section seeks to draw the strands of the investigation
together by offering observations on the extent to which and ways that interna-
tional diffusion and domestic factors interacted to influence the design of an ETS.
First, evidence from the New Zealand case suggests that international dif-
fusion mechanisms—both ideational and coercive—may be most pronounced
during initial decision-making on the adoption of emissions trading. The Kyoto
Protocol targets provided a key driver for politicians to initiate a broad-based
debate on New Zealand’s climate response, whereas the example of the EU
ETS helped engineer political space for the NZ ETS by demonstrating that green-
house gas trading was politically and technically feasible. Such interactions also
drew politicians and officials into international networks that engaged them in
dialogue on the advantages and methodologies of emissions trading. However,
international diffusion provides only a partial explanation for the adoption of
the NZ ETS, and two domestic considerations appear to have been particularly
salient: the failure of the carbon-tax proposal, which narrowed down the
government’s options for responding to the normative agenda of the Kyoto
Protocol, and the decision to adopt economic first principles as strategic goals
for the ETS. While the first consideration is traceable to international influences,
because developing a national climate response was critical to New Zealand’s
reputation as a Kyoto signatory, the second consideration is indicative of efforts
by the government to broaden support for an ETS by assessing its economic and
social implications and offering reassurances that the scheme would not endan-
ger key sectoral interests such as agriculture. Both considerations were under-
pinned by a preference for market-based approaches to economic reform,
rooted in the political elite and the neoliberal legacy of 1980s Rogernomics.
Second, the evidence indicates that domestic factors can exert an
increasing—and potentially dominant—influence on strategic decision-making
about ETS design features. Although analysis of other schemes occurred, the
main motivation in this case was scrutiny of their fit with New Zealand’s eco-
nomic and emissions circumstances. This draws attention to an important ana-
lytical distinction between two types of diffusion influences: those motivated by
learning, and those motivated primarily by a desire to ensure that preferred de-
sign features and calibrations do not create competitive or other disadvantages,
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such as problems with linking. Although both types of influences involve ele-
ments of learning and have the potential to lead to novel design features that
might later themselves diffuse (Jordan and Huitema 2014), they involve distinct
cognitive processes. Outright learning is more strongly associated with the dif-
fusion of knowledge and ideas (Jordan et al. 2013). The second process can be
labeled “competitive impact assessment” and is more analogous to a corpora-
tion conducting research on competitors to safeguard its markets. In such cases,
scrutiny is oriented less toward learning about ETS design and more toward con-
firming or recalibrating previously made design choices and avoiding a policy
miscalculation. Such diffusion forces are consequently likely to produce more
cautious and bounded changes in scheme design, unless a major design dispar-
ity with implications for competitiveness or linking is identified in light of es-
tablished preferences about the goals the policy is meant to achieve (Jordan
et al. 2003; Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer 2014). Active lesson drawing, involving
mimicking or sophisticated learning from practices that are deemed to be effec-
tive and appropriate to national circumstances, might become more prominent
during the technical stages of policy development, once key design parameters
are established and less politically risky incremental changes are possible.
These findings also underscore the value of analyzing the temporal dimen-
sions of climate policy design. New Zealand’s experiences lend weight to the
views that greater change (and openness to diffusion) may occur during the
early stages of policy experimentation, when politicians and officials are more
inclined to court ideas from overseas and investigate promising design features,
and that the political scope for change diminishes as the policy design and
adaptation “mature.” Although the setting of strategic goals for the NZ ETS prior
to the start of detailed design raises some questions about how open those
involved in designing the NZ ETS genuinely were to diffusion, at the time they
had limited information about its potential impacts on the New Zealand econ-
omy. As work on the ETS design progressed, accumulated knowledge about
these impacts and increased political attention to the ETS inhibited radical changes
to the scheme that might contravene the government’s strategic objectives.
Finally, deeper understanding of how domestic and international factors
interact during policy design may emerge from targeted examination of the
effects of both longer-term strategic factors and shorter-term political factors
and events on diffusion processes. Broadly speaking, strategic factors—
New Zealand’s emissions profile, dependent economic relationships, and neo-
liberal policy traditions—exerted relatively stable influences on the ETS design,
encouraging predictable and narrow channels of policy change based on its
“goodness of fit” with established national characteristics. Conversely, short-
term political factors and events—such as changes in government and recession-
ary periods—might facilitate more noticeable shifts in policy design, though the
evidence for this proposition is only ambiguous in this study. Interestingly, in
New Zealand these factors usually promoted greater introspection rather than
openness to external ideas, driven by an increased sense of vulnerability and a
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desire to ensure that the design features contributed to achieving key “national”
preferences.
Conclusions
The integrated analysis of international, domestic, and temporal factors affect-
ing the design of emissions trading that we have pursued in this article undoubt-
edly complicates the task of understanding the drivers and mechanisms of
climate policy design. We nevertheless argue that it offers the prospect of richer
understandings of the processes shaping climate policy development, by better
reflecting the complex and dynamic contexts facing decision-makers and offi-
cials. In particular, focusing on intersections between international and
domestic influences guards against overprioritizing international diffusion and
draws attention to distinguishing between international interactions driven by
learning or coercion and those motivated by avoiding negative material conse-
quences. Thus, the interacting-drivers perspective makes important contribu-
tions to explaining the existence of both convergent and divergent policy
outcomes resulting from international interactions.
This is not to say that diffusion cannot exert significant influences on the
development of climate policy. In New Zealand, coercive pressures and experi-
ences from other countries created the political scope for adopting a market-
based instrument by compelling action and demonstrating the viability of the
ETS approach. However, the dominant influence on the detailed design of the
NZ ETS was undoubtedly management of the potential material consequences
of climate action, through establishing New Zealand’s “first principles” of emis-
sions trading; aligning the scheme with its major trading partner, Australia; and
incorporating transitional and other measures (including unrestricted access to
international credits) to soften the economic impact of the scheme.
These findings indicate several potentially fruitful avenues for future re-
search on climate policy development. First, by highlighting the need to look
beyond diffusion influences, the study draws attention to the possibilities of
greater mutual engagement between diffusion studies and “goodness-of-fit”
and other related theories (Bailey 2002) to explain divergences in the designs
of different policies. Second, it underlines the value of temporal analysis for de-
veloping deeper understandings of how diffusion and learning interact across
the strategic and technical phases of climate policy development. Third, it indi-
cates a need for further examination of the real “innovativeness” of many
climate policies. Despite the widespread perception of climate change as a
wicked policy problem requiring innovative solutions, many actors involved
in developing the NZ ETS already had experience with designing regulated
and deregulated markets and saw a carbon market as merely another, not
particularly complex, extension of this process. The traces of these legacies on
the NZ ETS—for instance, the heavy emphasis on self-reporting and upstream
points of obligation—again indicates the need for further investigation of the
domestic lenses used to evaluate different approaches to climate policy.
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In-depth investigation of the factors that contribute to convergence and
divergence in the processes and outcomes of climate policy development repre-
sents an important frontier in climate politics research. We have shown that
national characteristics, policy legacies, party politics, and economic interests
are important mediators of international diffusion influences. Understanding
how diffusion outcomes differentiate during the course of policy adoption
and implementation within individual countries and, further, how these out-
comes and processes differentiate between countries are crucial to understanding
the factors influencing ETS design. Achieving this will necessitate venturing
beyond the international level and paying greater attention to tracing the longitu-
dinal dimension of policy development within domestic political arenas.
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